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Abstract 
 
We examine a program that enabled Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) in Kenya to hire novice teachers 
on short-term contracts, reducing class sizes in grade one from 82 to 44 on average. PTA teachers earned 
approximately one-quarter as much as teachers operating under central government civil-service 
institutions but were absent one day per week less and their students learned more. In the weak 
institutional environment we study, civil-service teachers responded to the program along two margins: 
first, they reduced their effort in response to the drop in the pupil-teacher ratio, and second, they 
influenced PTA committees to hire their relatives. Both effects reduced the educational impact of the 
program. A governance program that empowered parents within PTAs mitigated both effects. Better 
performing contract teachers are more likely to transition into civil-service positions and we estimate 
large potential dynamic benefits of contract teacher programs on the teacher workforce.   
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1. Introduction 
Social service delivery in developing countries is often of abysmally low quality.  Patients 
frequently do not receive correct diagnosis and treatment (Amin, Das and Goldstein, 2007), and 
students score very low on internationally comparable tests (Hanushek and Woessman, 2010). 
Policymakers seeking to address this problem have focused on two leading explanations: limited 
resources and poorly functioning governance institutions, leading to weak provider incentives 
(World Bank, 2004). 
Efforts to increase education resources typically focus on hiring more teachers to bring 
down pupil-teacher ratios.  While several studies in developed country contexts have found that 
reducing class size can increase test scores, at least in the short run,1 studies in lower-income 
countries consistently fail to find an effect of pupil-teacher ratio on test scores.2 One hypothesis 
is that weak governance institutions in many developing countries distort teacher incentives in 
ways that undermine the impact of hiring additional teachers.  
Whereas social service delivery in the United States and some other developed countries 
historically grew out of a system of locally-governed institutions (Goldin, 1999), many 
developing countries adopted centralized state control over social service delivery at 
independence. The appropriate governance roles of formal state institutions and local informal 
institutions in those countries have been hotly debated (Mamdani, 1996).  High teacher and 
health care worker absence rates (Chaudhury et al., 2006) can be seen as evidence of limited 
central state capacity or capture by providers. Recently, many developing countries, including 
Kenya, India, and Indonesia, have changed their constitutions to decentralize authority and 
incorporate a role for locally elected bodies in addition to professionals from central ministries in 
service delivery. 
In education, two widely-advocated reforms are hiring teachers locally, on short-term 
contracts, rather than centrally through a civil-service system, and School-Based Management 
(SBM). Both reforms have been implemented in many countries over the past decade.3  While 
                                                          
1 For positive effects see Krueger and Whitmore (2002) in the US, Angrist and Lavy (1999) in Israel, Piketty (2004) 
in France. Hoxby (2000) finds no significant effect in the US. 
2 The lack of effect in lower-income countries has been observed across a range of geographic contexts, starting with 
very different initial levels of class size, and examining both civil service and NGO teacher. See Banerjee, Jacob, 
and Kremer (2005), Banerjee et al. (2007), and Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009). 
3 Contract teachers have been used in Benin, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Guinea, many Indian states, Indonesia, Madagascar, Mali, Nicaragua, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Mali, Niger, Togo, and 
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some applaud these trends, others are concerned that the abandonment of civil-service hiring 
rules may create the potential for capture by local elites and favoritism in hiring. 
We examine these reforms in a Kenyan context. We find that locally hired contract teachers 
are much more likely to be present in class and teaching than civil-service teachers, and that their 
students learn more. Yet the potential learning impact of adding contract teachers to schools is 
not fully realized due to partial capture – not by traditional local elites, but rather by local agents 
of the state (civil-service teachers). Specifically, we find that civil-service teachers respond to the 
introduction of contract teacher programs by (1) reducing their own effort and (2) securing 
contract teacher positions for relatives.  Both forms of capture can be mitigated and learning can 
improve, however, when contract teacher programs are combined with SBM reforms that 
promote parental involvement and control at the local level. 
We examine a program in Kenya which provided funds for Parent-Teacher Association 
(PTA) committees to hire additional teachers and to create an additional section in grade one, 
reducing class size from 82 to 44 on average.  The locally-hired contract teachers earned only 
about one quarter as much as existing teachers. Whereas existing teachers were civil servants 
employed by the central government, represented by a strong union, and under the authority of 
other professional educators, the new teachers were on short-term contracts and under the 
authority of PTA committees composed primarily of parents. The contract teachers were 
responsible for a particular class and stayed with that class over two years, rather than rotating in 
and out of classes to teach a particular subject. Students were randomly assigned to the class 
taught by existing civil-service teachers or that taught by the contract teacher.   
In a (randomly selected) subset of schools participating in the contract teacher program, 
parents in the PTA committee received School-Based Management (SBM) training on how to 
interview and select job applicants, monitor and assess teachers’ effort and performance, and 
perform a formal review of the contract teacher’s performance to decide whether to renew her 
contract.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
other African countries (see Duthilleul, 2005, for a review, Kumar et al., 2005, and Chaudhury et al., 2006). For 
evaluations of such programs, see DeLaat and Vegas (2003) and Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2010). School-
Based Management programs have been implemented in Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Lebanon, Lesotho, Macedonia, Madagascar, Mexico, Nicaragua, the Philippines, 
Senegal, Serbia, Sri Lanka, The Gambia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See Blimpo and Evans (2011), 
Gertler et al. (2011), Banerjee et al. (2010), King and Ozler (1998), Ozler (2001), Kaestner and Gershberg (2002) 
and Bruns et al. (2011) for a review. 
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Overall, test scores after 18 months were 0.16 standard deviations higher in schools with 
contract teacher programs than in comparison schools. Locally-hired contract teachers were 
present in class far more often than civil-service teachers and students randomly assigned to 
contract teachers learned substantially more than those assigned to civil-service teachers.  
In the absence of the SBM training program, existing civil-service teachers responded to the 
contract teacher program and the resulting change in pupil-teacher ratio in ways that reduced its 
effectiveness.  First, they substantially reduced the rate at which they were in class. Despite the 
tremendous reduction in class size, pupils who remained with civil-service teachers in schools 
without SBM training saw only a small, insignificant increase in test scores.  Second, there is 
evidence of rent-seeking on behalf of relatives. In the absence of SBM, 31% of those hired as 
contract teachers were relatives of existing civil-service teachers.  Hiring of relatives was 
particularly common in schools where more existing civil-service teachers were male (and thus 
more likely to have relatives nearby, since Kenya is a patrilocal society). 
SBM training for PTA committees mitigated both effects.  Civil-service teachers in SBM 
schools were more likely to be present and teaching, and student test scores were 
correspondingly higher in their classes.  Only 16% of those hired as contract teachers in SBM 
schools were teacher relatives, and there is evidence that teacher relatives hired in SBM schools 
were more likely to be present in class and that their students learned more. 
Under some assumptions, we can use an instrumental variables approach based on 
experimental variation to separately estimate the roles of class size and teacher effort. We 
estimate that teacher effort has a large effect on test scores, and holding teacher effort constant, 
smaller classes moderately increase test scores.  The class size effect we estimate is statistically 
significant, but five to ten times smaller than has been sometimes observed in developed 
countries.  
These results suggest that endogenous behavioral responses under weak governance 
institutions may help explain why increases in resources alone have generally had disappointing 
effects on test scores in developing countries (see Kremer and Holla, 2009, for a review). If some 
of the additional resources are diverted by teachers, as we observe, or by parents as observed in 
Das et al. (2004, 2011), the overall effect of a change in resources will be dampened, compared 
to the direct effect the added resources would have on learning if everything else could be kept 
constant.  
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Our finding that resources have greater impact in a better governance environment is 
consistent with Lavy (2010), who finds greater productivity of instructional time in countries 
with greater school accountability and school autonomy in hiring and firing teachers.  More 
generally, recent randomized evaluations of education find substantial similarity in consumer 
behavior across contexts but much more heterogeneity in program impacts on provider behavior 
(Kremer and Holla, 2009).  Our results suggest that this may be due to interactions across 
different elements of the governance and provider incentive system.  Complementarities between 
different components of the governance and incentive system and between this system and 
resources could help reconcile the very large differences in test scores across countries (on the 
order of a standard deviation) with the typically smaller estimated impacts of specific 
educational interventions. 
Almost half of the contract teachers were eventually hired as permanent teachers by the civil 
service, and contract teachers whose students learned more were more likely to obtain positions 
as civil-service teachers. Our results should therefore be interpreted as shedding light on the 
potential impact of a system in which teachers are initially hired as contract teachers by local 
PTA committees before becoming eligible to be hired as civil servants.4 Such a system has the 
potential not only to reduce salary costs and improve performance during the period of contract-
teacher service, but also to improve learning in the long run, by improving the teacher workforce. 
With relatively conservative assumptions we estimate that if teachers started their careers by 
working for three years on contract for PTAs that received SBM training and then were hired 
into the civil-service according to the process observed over the duration of our study, the steady 
state gain in test scores for the education system as a whole would be 0.18 standard deviations. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background on 
central government and local community institutions for school governance in Kenya. Section 3 
describes the Extra Teacher Program, the experimental design, and the data. Section 4 presents 
the impact of the program on test scores and teacher behavior, and uses the variation introduced 
by the program to separately estimate the impact of pupil-teacher ratios and teacher effort on test 
scores. Section 5 discusses the potential dynamic impact of contract teacher hiring on the teacher 
workforce, based on evidence about how contract teachers’ performance affects their likelihood 
of being hired as civil-service teachers and how school committees select contract teachers. 
Section 6 draws conclusions and discusses evidence on related programs.  
                                                          
4 Murgai and Pritchett (2006) recommended that such a system should be adopted in India. 
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2. Education Governance in Kenya 
As noted in the introduction, many developing countries adopted highly centralized education 
systems at much lower levels of development than did some of today’s developed countries. 
Newly independent states adopted central control in part to rapidly expand education levels from 
a low base and in part as an element in nation-building, designed to unify diverse segments of 
society. Civil-service rules were seen as an important bulwark against politicization, ethnic 
favoritism, and nepotism in hiring and in favor of professionalism.5   
Kenya has had an evolving mixture of local, informal education governance and governance 
by the central state, but over time the role of the central state has grown, while that of local 
institutions has shrunk.  During the colonial period, churches and local communities started 
many independent schools.  While the Harambee movement in the late 60s and 70s encouraged 
local communities to start schools and retained representation of parents, the local community, 
and founding churches on school committees, overall the post-independence government 
adopted a fairly centralized education system.  Civil-service headmasters and teachers were sent 
to take over successful Harambee schools and school committees were de facto relegated to 
fundraising rather than teacher governance.  The Ministry of Education sought to professionalize 
and standardize teacher training, hiring, and discipline. A strong teacher union strengthened the 
emphasis on formal educational qualifications and on accountability to professional norms rather 
than to local parents.    
 
2.1 TSC and PTA teachers 
Historically, Kenyan schools have had two types of teachers –those hired as civil servants 
through the Teachers Service Commission (TSC) of the Ministry of Education and Parent-
Teacher Association (PTA) teachers hired locally and informally by local school committees. 
For civil-service teachers, who have long constituted the vast majority of teachers, promotion, 
transfers, and disciplinary measures are decided through the TSC, rather than by more locally 
accountable bodies. Hiring and promotions are based heavily on formal, objective criteria, such 
as educational qualifications and experience. These teachers are represented by a strong union, 
                                                          
5 Debates over community vs. central control of education have had an important ethnic dimension in the United 
States as well, for example with the racially-charged contention between community activists and the teachers union 
after New York State experimented with community control in the 1960s (Schiff, 1976).  
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have civil-service protection, and receive wages and benefits considerably above market-clearing 
levels.  Disciplinary issues are addressed by the TSC through formal legalistic procedures with 
adjudication by panels dominated by professional educators. Graduates of teacher training 
colleges typically have to queue for civil-service jobs, often undergoing many years of 
unemployment before they are hired. 
PTA teachers are hired by PTA committees at each school. PTA committees are primarily 
composed of parent representatives, elected for each class. Thus a particular parent member is 
responsible for representing the interest of parents of children in grade 1, another represents 
parents of children in grade 2, etc. School committees also include some additional ex officio 
members, including the headmaster, or a member appointed by the founding church. There is 
considerable variance in the de facto relative strength of the headmaster and parents in the PTA. 
Some school committees are dominated by the headmaster, but in others parents or other 
community members play a very influential role. Hiring and supervision of PTA teachers is quite 
informal, with much left to the discretion of the school committee or headmaster. 
PTA teachers are typically paid much less than their TSC counterparts. In the area of study, 
in 2004, PTA teachers received compensation in the range of 2,000 Kenyan shillings, or US$ 25 
per month. In comparison, the average civil service teacher received around US$ 120 per month 
plus benefits, including housing allowances, provisions for retirement, and medical coverage 
(Glewwe et al., 2010).  PTA teachers are effectively at will employees of the school committee. 
Despite the low pay and lack of job security, PTA positions are actively sought after by 
unemployed teachers, in part because teaching experience helps them obtain formal civil service 
teaching position.  
 
2.2 National Politics, Free Primary Education, and Local Governance 
In the Kenyan political context, national politics has been about assembling coalitions of local 
ethnic leaders, with politicians competing largely on their ability to deliver resources to their 
constituencies. National political leaders placed in charge of a Ministry therefore had more 
incentive to focus their energies on delivering resources to their home areas than on transferring 
value from teachers nationally to parents nationally, for example through enforcement of rules 
prohibiting unauthorized teacher absence. Their constituents would gain only a small fraction of 
any benefits from tougher enforcement. The shifting pattern of coalitions among local leaders 
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meant there was little discipline from a national political party interested in building a reputation 
for delivering services. 
School committees were a means for a local role in school governance, but, as argued 
elsewhere (Kremer et al., 2003) their structure tilted towards representation of local elites, so 
they typically favored higher levels of fees and enforcement of rules requiring uniforms, for 
example than the median voter in Kenya would have preferred. There were also sometimes 
tensions between parent representatives and the often more educated teachers and headmasters, 
who sometimes resented having lower-status, less-educated PTA members.  
With Kenya’s first fully competitive election in 2002, politicians with national ambitions 
were incentivized to appeal directly to the typical voter rather than to rely as exclusively on the 
previous pattern of assembling coalitions of local leaders. They promised free primary education, 
thus appealing to voters of lower socio-economic status than typically serve on school 
committees. 
After primary school fees were abolished in 2003, enrollment rose nearly 30 percent. Since 
parents were no longer required to pay fees, local school committees were generally unable to 
raise the funds necessary to hire PTA teachers. They received grants from the central 
government, but the grants had to be spent on physical inputs, not hiring teachers locally, so de 
facto the introduction of truly competitive national elections and free primary education 
strengthened the role of the central ministries in teacher governance at the expense of parents and 
local elites. Many parents exited the public system, turning to informal private schools, which 
have grown dramatically since the introduction of free primary education (Lucas and Mbiti, 
2011). A survey we conducted with over 300 primary schools in 2004 showed that 80 percent 
had no locally-hired teachers. Average class size in first grade in 2005 was 83, and median class 
size was 74; 28 percent of grade 1 classes had more than 100 pupils.  
 
3. The Extra Teacher Program and Study Design 
3.1 Program Description 
Extra Teacher Program  
More than three-quarters of education spending in low-income countries goes to teachers, and 
many efforts to increase resources for education focus on hiring extra teachers to bring down 
class size or accommodate additional pupils. The Extra Teacher Program (ETP), implemented in 
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2005 and 2006, provided funds to school committees to hire PTA teachers to supplement TSC 
teachers teaching in lower grades. The program was implemented by the non-governmental 
organization International Child Support (ICS), with funding from the World Bank, in a random 
subset of schools in three districts of Western Kenya. ICS staff met with the headmaster, the 
civil-service teachers assigned to the lower grades, and the parents of students in grade 1 to 
explain how the program worked and ask if they wanted to participate. To qualify for ICS 
funding the PTA teachers hired under the ETP contract had to have the same academic 
qualifications as civil-service teachers, and schools participating in the program had to create an 
additional section in first grade and to randomly assign students and the ETP contract teacher 
across sections. (The randomization was carried out by ICS staff with support from the research 
team.) Other inputs such as classroom facilities, were also supposed to be equally allocated 
across sections.6  
PTA teachers hired under ETP focused on a specific class (one of the sections in first 
grade), in contrast to TSC teachers who most often focused on a particular subject. This mirrors 
the organization of school committees and made it easier for parents to hold teachers accountable 
for absenteeism. For example, if a parent knows that their child was unsupervised during the day, 
they know who is responsible if a single teacher is assigned to the class. When the program 
continued the following school year, school committees were free to replace or keep the ETP 
contract teacher, but they were asked to move the teacher to second grade with the same group of 
students.7 
The monthly allowance for teachers under the ETP program was 2,500 Kenyan shillings 
(around US$35), putting it at the top of the range of what is typically paid to locally-hired 
contract teachers by school committees in Kenya, but at only one quarter of the typical TSC 
teachers’ salaries, and a smaller fraction of their compensation, since civil-service teachers also 
receive benefits including not only pensions but also housing allowances.  
The ETP program represents a shift in the balance between local parent control and formal 
professional control, central standards, and the role of the state, but it should be seen as 
augmenting, rather than replacing, the role of the central state. Eligibility for the program was 
                                                          
6 In practice, established civil-service teachers may have pulled rank and obtained better physical classroom 
infrastructure. We do not have data to estimate how common this was, but in any case, it would tend to bias 
downwards estimates of the contract teacher effect and bias upwards estimates of the effectiveness of class-size 
reductions. 
7 Students enrolled in grade 2 in 2005 and who repeated grade 2 in 2006 were randomly assigned to either the 
contract teacher or the civil service teachers in 2006.  
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restricted to graduates of teacher training colleges, and ETP contract teachers reported to 
centrally appointed headmasters. As mentioned above, headmasters typically have considerable 
influence within school committees. Contract teachers hired under the ETP program were likely 
motivated in part by the prospect that they would eventually obtain civil-service jobs. 
 
School-Based Management Training (SBM)  
The School-Based Management (SBM) training, implemented by a trained ICS officer in a 
random subset of ETP schools, was  designed to empower PTA committee members (in 
particular, the parents, as opposed to only the headmaster) to monitor teachers’ performance. The 
training lasted about 90 minutes, and immediately followed the meeting that ICS held with 
parents to inform them of the Extra-Teacher Program. All parents were welcome to stay for the 
SBM training if they so wished. During the training, PTA committee members were encouraged 
to supervise the recruiting of the extra-teacher, taught how to conduct interviews, and taught 
techniques for soliciting input from other parents and checking teacher attendance. Two parents 
of grade 1 students were asked to volunteer to perform attendance checks on the teachers on a 
regular basis, and were given a notebook in which to record attendance. A formal sub-committee 
of first grade parents was formed to evaluate the contract teacher and deliver a performance 
report at the end of the first year.  Finally, the PTA committees were asked to hold a formal 
review meeting at the end of the first school year of the program to assess the contract teacher’s 
performance and decide whether to renew the teacher’s contract or replace the teacher. Although 
the SBM training focused on training parents to monitor the contract teacher, the advice it 
provided on how to measure teacher performance may have helped parents to notice, and act on, 
the greater absence issues among the civil-service teachers, to make sure the contract teacher was 
effectively used to increase resources available to grade 1 pupils, rather than to make life easier 
for the other teachers. The additional cost of implementing this training program was about $100 
per school (compared to around $420 per year in salary costs for the contract teacher).  
 
Tracking 
A separate set of schools were chosen for an alternative ETP program. In those schools, the first-
grade class was divided into two sections by initial achievement (“tracking”), and the ETP 
contract teacher was randomly assigned to one of these sections. This program is discussed in a 
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companion paper (Duflo et al. 2011), and data for the schools participating in that program are 
not part of the sample analyzed in this paper. 
3.2 Experimental Design 
Background data on enrollment, pupil-teacher ratio, and number of grade 1 sections was 
collected in 210 primary schools in Kenya’s Western Province in 2004. Of these, 70 were 
randomly assigned to the tracking program and are not the focus of this paper. The remaining 
140 schools were stratified by administrative division and number of grade 1 sections and 
randomly divided into a comparison group, and an Extra Teacher Program (ETP) group, each 
with 70 schools. Thirty four of the 70 ETP schools were randomly chosen to be offered the 
opportunity to participate in SBM training. ICS held its schools meetings to explain the program 
to parents and teachers in March 2005. All schools offered the opportunity to participate in the 
ETP and SBM programs chose to do so. School committees selected for the ETP program 
generally had teachers in place by early May 2005, the start of the second of the three school 
terms in Kenya’s academic year. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics. Panel A shows no significant differences in observable 
characteristics at baseline. Panel B suggests that the program was successful at reducing pupil-
teacher ratios over two years. While average class size in grade 1 in 2005 in the comparison 
schools was 82, it was only 44 in ETP schools.8  This class size gap was somewhat attenuated the 
following year in second grade: in 2006, average class size in second grade was 68 in 
comparison schools and 42 in ETP schools.9 
Students typically attended their assigned section when both teachers were present, but 
when teachers were absent, sections were sometimes combined. On average across four 
unannounced school visits, 94% of students were found in their assigned section (conditional on 
the two sections being taught separately), and there was no significant difference between 
schools with and without SBM training. Sections were found pooled in only 10.7% of visits. The 
rate at which classes were pooled was not affected by the SBM training.10 
 
                                                          
8 Class size did not fall by exactly 50% since some schools already had two Grade 1 sections at baseline. In these 
schools, the introduction of the Extra Teacher Program reduced class size by only one third. 
9 The repetition rate is relatively high in Kenya. In year 2 of the program, the population in grade 2 thus included 
both those sampled students who had been promoted and did not transfer to another school, and grade 2 repeaters. 
10 Analysis of the determinants of class pooling shows that absence of TSC teachers is a main driver of pooling, but 
contract teacher absence is not. This suggests that contract teachers covered for TSC teachers when TSC teachers 
were absent, but TSC teachers did not cover for contract teachers when those were absent. 
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3.3 Study Sample 
Summary statistics about the students and teachers in the study are shown in Table 1. The 
student sample includes a cohort of approximately 13,500 children enrolled in first grade at the 
end of the first school term of 2005. Students averaged 7.7 years old at the outset of the program 
(with a standard deviation of 0.5 years), but ages ranged from 5 to 14. Baseline data on students’ 
initial achievement was collected from the school records at the onset of the study. This data is 
not based on a common scale across schools, and thus can only be used for within-school 
comparisons. Random assignment of students to teachers in ETP schools led to sections with 
comparable average baseline scores. 
A total of 754 teachers taught lessons in first grade in 2005, in second grade in 2006, or 
both.  Of those, 653 were centrally hired civil-service teachers, while 101 contract teachers were 
hired through the program by the 70 ETP schools over the five school terms (corresponding to 15 
months of instructions) it operated.  Average age was 43 for civil-service teachers and 27 for 
contract teachers, and contract teachers had 13 fewer years of experience than their TSC 
counterparts on average. Contract teachers were also much less likely to be females than TSC 
teachers in our sample (48% versus 69%). This is in part due to the fact that TSC teachers in our 
sample are those assigned to lower grades, and female teachers are disproportionately assigned to 
lower grades. The share of females in the entire TSC teacher body is on average 55% in our 
sample of schools, statistically indistinguishable from the percentage among contract teachers. 
 
3.4 Data 
Test Scores and Attrition 
Standardized tests covering math and literacy questions ranging from identifying numbers and 
letters to subtracting two-digit numbers and writing words were administered in all schools after 
5 school terms (19 months total, but only 15 months of instruction), just before the program 
ended (November 2006). The same tests were administered again during a follow-up one year 
after the program ended (November 2007).  Tests were administered by trained enumerators and 
graded blindly by a separate team of enumerators. In each school, 60 students were randomly 
drawn from the initial sample to participate in the tests.  
To limit attrition, enumerators were instructed to go to the homes of students who had 
dropped out or were absent on the day of the test and bring them to school for the test. Not all 
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students were found and tested, however. Overall, the attrition rate was 18 percent for the endline 
test, and 23 percent for the long-run follow-up test.  
Appendix Table A1 presents estimates of attrition by treatment groups. At endline, attrition 
was lower in ETP schools, especially for students assigned to the contract teachers. Low 
achievement students were significantly less likely to attrit from SBM schools, and less likely to 
attrit if they had been assigned to the contract teacher (although surprisingly if they were 
assigned to the contract teacher in an SBM school, they were not significantly less likely to 
attrit). This suggests that the differential attrition will bias downwards the estimates of the impact 
of SBM on students assigned to regular teachers, and bias downwards the estimates of the short-
run impact of contract teachers in non-SBM schools. The interaction between being in an SBM 
school and being taught by the contract teacher led to significantly lower attrition among higher-
achieving students, however. Estimates of the effect of the combination of SBM and contract 
teacher may thus be upward biased. The patterns of attrition are roughly similar in the long-run 
follow-up. Given the substantial evidence of differential attrition, when estimating impacts on 
test scores below we estimate lower bounds correcting for attrition. 
 
Teacher Effort 
Over the course of the program, four unannounced school visits were made by the research team 
to measure teacher effort. Teacher effort was measured by the teacher’s presence in school and 
by whether she was in class teaching when the observers entered the school compound.  Data on 
pedagogy was collected through classroom observations and structured interviews with teachers.  
 
Hiring, Retention, and Regularization of Contract Teachers 
In the school term that followed the start of the program, data was collected on the contract-
teachers hired through the program, including their demographic characteristics, past experience, 
relationship to the school, and the hiring process. Demographic data was also collected on civil-
service teachers. In the school term that followed the end of the program, headmasters of 
program schools were interviewed about the status of the contract-teacher, and whether the 
school committee had taken over the extra-teacher program after the ICS subsidy ended. 
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4. Results: Program Impacts and Interpretation 
This section estimates the program impacts on pupil test scores (Subsection 4.1) and teacher 
behavior (Subsection 4.2). Subsection 4.3 reports the results of an instrumental variables analysis 
designed to separately estimate the impact of pupil-teacher ratios and teacher effort on learning.  
 
4.1 Learning Outcomes  
We use the following reduced form equation to estimate the effects of each program component 
on student outcomes:  
Yij = a1ETPj + a2ETPj × SBMj + a3ETPj × CTij + a4ETPj × CTij × SBMj + Xij’a5 + εij1 (1) 
where Yij  is the endline test score of student i in school j (expressed in standard deviations of the 
distribution of scores in the comparison schools),11  ETPj  is a dummy equal to 1 if school j 
participated in the Extra Teacher Program, SBMj  is a dummy equal to 1 if school j participated in 
the School-Based Management training, CTij  is a dummy equal to 1 if student i was assigned to 
the contract teacher, and Xij  is a vector of student and teacher control variables.  
The results are presented in Table 2. We present the results of three specifications that vary 
in the content of the Xij vector. The first specification includes no controls at all. The second 
specification includes the following school-level controls: school size, the share of female among 
TSC teachers in lower grades and the average experience of TSC teachers in lower grades; and 
the following student-level controls: gender, standardized test score at baseline, age at the time of 
the test, and date of the test. Finally, the third specification further controls for whether the 
teacher is “novice,” that is, has less than 1 year of experience (this is the case for less than 1% of 
the civil service teachers and 24% of the contract teachers).  Of course, this contract teacher 
characteristic is endogenous to the program, so for some purposes readers may prefer to focus on 
specifications without this control. However, for other purposes, results should account for 
teacher experience. For example, if one believes that novice teachers typically have lower value-
added, as is consistent with a range of previous studies (Kane et al., 2008; Rockoff and Staiger, 
2010), and considering that all teachers must spend a year as novices under any institutional 
arrangements, then estimates controlling for novice status may be appropriate. We present both 
sets of estimates and find little difference. Appendix Table A2 shows the estimated lower bounds 
for these specifications accounting for attrition, using the approach first proposed in Lee (2008). 
                                                          
11 An alternative specification of the endline test score for math, using item response theory, yields similar results 
(available from the authors). The format of the language score was not appropriate for this exercise.  
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In equation (1), a1 is the effect of being in a reduced pupil-teacher ratio environment, for 
students assigned to civil-service teachers in non-SBM schools. This effect is small (0.074 
standard deviations in column 2 of Table 2, the specification with the full set of control 
variables) and insignificantly different from zero (standard error: 0.088). The 95% confidence 
interval excludes gains of even one-quarter of a standard deviation for a decline in class size of 
almost 50%.  
The coefficient a2 is the difference between test scores of students in SBM and non-SBM 
schools for students assigned to the civil-service teachers in ETP schools. The difference is 
sizeable: students assigned to the civil-service teacher score approximately 0.13 standard 
deviations higher in SBM schools, relative to non-SBM schools. The difference is not significant 
for overall test scores, but is significant at the 10% level for math at approximately 0.18 standard 
deviations.  This very cheap intervention more than doubles the effectiveness of the Extra 
Teacher Program, and makes it significantly positive, controlling for teacher experience: overall, 
students assigned to the civil-service teachers in schools that receive the ETP program with the 
SBM training do significantly better (0.204 standard deviations with a p-value of 0.036, Table 2 
column 2, row 14) than students in comparison schools. This result appears relatively robust to 
controlling for attrition, even with strict assumptions: the lower bound estimate for this effect, 
presented in column 1, row 14 of Table A2, is 0.143 (with a p-value of 0.129). 
Coefficient a3 in equation (1) is the difference between test scores of students assigned to 
civil-service teachers and those assigned to contract teachers, in schools without SBM. Students’ 
scores are 0.228 standard deviations higher if they are assigned to the contract teacher rather than 
to civil-service teachers (Table 2, column 2, row 3). The lower bound of this difference estimated 
in Table A2 remains high and significant at conventional levels. The SBM training program 
partly bridges the gap between children assigned to the civil-service teachers and those assigned 
to the contract teacher: the difference is lower in SBM schools (coefficient a4, Table 2, row 4). 
Since all teachers will have to be novices for exactly one year of their careers, in calculating 
the benefit of the PTA contract teacher program, it is conceptually appropriate to net out the 
novice teacher effect. As noted above, roughly one-quarter of contract teachers are novices, and 
when one controls for this, the estimated contract teacher effect grows to 0.241 standard 
deviations (row 3, column 3). The coefficient estimate on the novice teacher dummy is -0.065 
with a standard error of 0.091 (Table 2, column 3, row 11). Of course, the coefficient on novice 
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teachers in the regression is based on non-experimental variation and may not represent the 
causal impact of being a novice teacher, so this estimate should be interpreted with caution. 12  
The breakdown by subjects in columns 4 to 7 suggests that all the effects are stronger in math 
than in literacy. Both the SBM effect and the contract teacher effect are more than double for 
math than for literacy.  
Appendix Table A3 presents the long-run impacts. A year after the program ended, program 
effects remain significant only for students in schools with SBM training. The fact that fadeout is 
less pronounced among this subgroup of schools is consistent with the fact that, as we will 
discuss below in section 5.2, schools with SBM training were significantly more likely to retain 
the contract teacher over the year that followed the end of the subsidized ETP program. The 
long-run effect on test scores in SBM schools is only significant at the 10% level for math, and it 
loses significance when we estimate the lower bound correcting for attrition. 
4.2 Teacher Effort and Pedagogy 
Table 3 estimates program impact on teacher effort and on pedagogy using data from 
unannounced spot checks; classroom observations conducted with a subset of teachers; and 
surveys administered to teachers.   
Contract teachers were 27.8 percentage points more likely to be found in a classroom and 
teaching during a random visit than civil-service teachers in comparison schools (the mean for 
the civil-service teachers in the comparison group was 57.9%, see Table 3, column 1, row 10). 
Civil-service teachers in ETP schools were 12.9 percentage points less likely to be found in class 
teaching during a school visit than their counterparts in comparison schools. This effect is 
significant at the 1% level (Table 3, Column 1) and corresponds to a 22 percent decrease in 
teacher presence in class compared to comparison schools. This suggests that civil-service 
teachers took advantage of the presence of the contract teachers to work less. Contract teachers 
might not have been in a position to refuse teaching combined classes when civil-service 
teachers were absent.  
There is evidence that this reduction in effort by civil-service teachers was largely mitigated 
through community empowerment, however. Civil-service teachers in schools that received the 
ETP program with SBM training were 7.5 percentage points more likely to be found in class 
                                                          
12 We note however that our point estimate of -0.065 is very similar to those observed in the US. Rockoff and 
Staiger (2010) estimate novice effects of -0.07 in Los Angeles and -0.06 to -0.08 in New York City. 
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teaching than those in schools that received the ETP program alone (Table 3, Row 2, Column 1; 
the standard error is 0.043). It seems likely that SBM directly affected civil-service teachers, 
rather than influencing them by reducing the likelihood PTA teachers would cover classes for 
them, since we find no effect of SBM training on the likelihood that contract teachers were 
covering classes for civil-service teachers during unscheduled school visits (results available 
upon request).  
The ETP program did not affect teacher presence on the school compound, but  rather the 
likelihood that teachers were in class teaching, rather than, for example, in the staffroom 
drinking tea with other teachers or reading a newspaper (Table 3, Columns 2 and 3). Note that it 
seems easier for teachers to adjust on this margin, but on the other hand, it seems more difficult 
for parents to observe and enforce along this margin.  
We measured changes in pedagogy through direct observation of lessons; and structured 
interviews with teachers about classroom processes. Students in ETP schools were more likely to 
be called to the blackboard and to be called on to answer questions. Teachers in those schools 
(whether civil servants or contract teachers) also report having more time to provide individual 
attention to children. However, SBM training did not seem to affect our measures of pedagogy 
(Table 3, Columns 4 to 9.)   A smaller share of students of novice teachers report answering 
questions and novice teachers report difficulty paying attention to slow learners.  
 
4.3 Interpreting the test scores gains: the role of class size and teacher effort  
While the estimates in section 4.1 and 4.2 are interesting in their own right, under certain 
assumptions, they can also be combined to disentangle the possible gains of decreasing class size 
(keeping effort constant) and the impact of effort (proxied by teacher’s time in class). To do this, 
we take advantage of the difference between weakly incentivized civil-service teachers and more 
strongly incentivized PTA teachers, as well as the SBM program, which changed teacher effort 
but not the pupil-teacher ratio.  
We are interested in estimating the following equation:  
   Yij = b1PTRij+ b2Eij + Xij’b3 + Sj’ b4 + εij3    (3) 
in which PTRij is the pupil-teacher ratio faced by student i in school j  and Eij  is the average 
effort level of student i’s teachers in school j. Xij is a vector of students’ characteristics and Sj is a 
vector of school characteristics. 
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We consider two different IV estimates, with different exclusion restrictions. None of these 
exclusion restrictions are perfect, so the exercise is more illustrative than absolutely definitive. 
First, we assume that, conditional on teacher’s sex and experience (which are observed), the 
only difference between contract teachers and civil-service teachers is that contract teachers have 
stronger incentives. Under this assumption, the design provides four instruments for PTR and E: 
whether the student is in an ETP school, whether the student is in an SBM school, whether the 
student was assigned to a contract teacher, and the interaction between being assigned to a 
contract teacher and being in an SBM school. The first stage equations are:13  
Eij = c1ETPj + c2ETPj × SBMj + c3ETPj × CTij + c4ETPj × CTij × SBMj + εij4                   (4) 
PTRij = d1ETPj + d2ETPj × SBMj + d3ETPj × CTij + d4ETPj × CTij × SBMj + εij5     (5) 
The second IV estimate relaxes the assumption that contract teachers and civil-service 
teachers affect students differently only due to their differences in experience, sex, and effort. 
Relaxing this assumption is important since contract teachers were instructed to spend all day 
with one specific section/class, and to teach all subjects to this class, while in most schools civil-
service teachers rotate across sections/classes, teaching one subject to many classes. This could 
change teacher effort, for example if teachers focused on a single grade are more accountable or 
develop stronger bonds with their pupils. This is not a problem for the IV estimation. However, 
if there are pedagogical effects of being taught by a single teacher throughout the day, holding 
teacher effort constant, this would violate the exclusion restriction for “assigned to contract 
teacher” as an instrument for teacher effort.14, 
Due to the variation in teacher effort induced by the SBM program and its interaction with 
other variables, equation (3) is still identified if we control in addition for a dummy for whether 
the teacher is a contract teacher: we still have three instruments for two endogenous variables. 
We thus also estimate a version of equation (3) which controls for whether the teacher is a 
contract teacher: 
Yij = b1PTRj+ b2Ej + Xij’b3 + Sj’ b4 + b5CTij + εij7                              (6) 
                                                          
13 These equations are estimated in Appendix Table A4. The results on teacher’s effort were already discussed in the 
previous section. The class size results are unsurprising: by design, class size is much lower in ETP schools, by 39 
students on average. Students in schools without the School-Based Management program who were assigned to 
contract teachers ended up in slightly larger classes than students assigned to the civil-service teachers (this is due to 
chance, as teachers were randomly assigned to each section).  
14 Evidence shown in Table 3 and discussed earlier suggests that contract teachers exert more effort than civil 
service teachers along other dimensions besides class attendance.  In particular, contract teachers were more likely 
to have a lesson plan prepared and to help students individually. This will not violate the exclusion restriction as 
long as class attendance serves as a good overall proxy for teacher effort.  
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In practice, power is lower since the effort differences due to SBM are smaller than those due to 
the teacher’s contract structure. In particular, for contract teachers, SBM only impacted effort if 
the teacher was related to a TSC teacher. 
The exclusion restriction for SBM as an instrument for effort would itself be violated if 
SBM affected test scores through channels other than teacher effort, for example by leading 
teachers to adopt a more interactive approach with pupils, or through a different selection 
process for those teachers (we discuss this possibility in more details below). The data on 
pedagogy presented in Table 3 and discussed earlier provides little evidence that the program led 
to such effects. SBM (alone) had no significant effect on any of the classroom dynamics 
variables. Specifically, teachers in SBM schools were not more likely to call students to the 
blackboard or to encourage students to ask questions than teachers in other ETP schools. Thus, 
while SBM significantly increased teachers’ presence in the classroom, it did not affect what 
teachers did once they were in the classroom.  
Table 4 presents estimates of the first instrumental variable equation, equation (3) for 
overall scores (Columns 1, 2 and 3), math (Columns 5, 6, 7) and language (Columns 9, 10 and 
11), each using different control variables included in the vector S. The results are similar across 
specifications. Overall, test scores would increase by 0.042 to 0.064 standard deviations with a 
10-student reduction in class size. Since the class size reduction we observe was close to 40 
pupils, that means that, if civil-service teachers had not changed their effort in response to the 
program, the ETP Program would have increased test scores by 0.17 to 0.26 standard deviations 
While significant, these results are fairly modest: they suggest a per-pupil effect that is about 3 
times smaller than the effect found for Israeli 4th graders by Angrist and Lavy (1999), and about 
8 times smaller than the per-pupil effect implied by the 8-student reduction in the Tennessee Star 
experiment (Krueger and Whitmore, 2002). However, our results are consistent with other results 
suggesting fairly modest (or no) impact of class size reductions in developing countries. This 
may be in part because classes, in our context as in those,  remained fairly large (the reduced 
class size still had 44 students on average), or because weak governance hindered changes in 
pedagogy that lower class size may enable in developed countries.15  
Results in columns 5-7 and 9-11 of Table 4 also suggest that teacher effort has a strong 
effect on learning: a 10 percentage point decrease in teacher absence from class would increase 
                                                          
15 In appendix Table A5, we present the coefficients for equation (3) estimated separately for schools with classes 
below and above the median size (76 pupils). The coefficient estimates for the effect of class size is twice as large in 
small classes as in big classes, but the standard errors are large and we cannot reject the null of equality. 
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test scores by 0.09 to 0.12 standard deviations in math, and 0.05 to 0.14 standard deviations in 
language (0.08 to 0.14 overall, columns 1-3). All these estimates are significant. Interestingly, 
these estimates are virtually identical to the estimated effect of a reduction in absence reported 
by Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan (2009).  
These results are overall unchanged when we use our second IV strategy, which does not use 
contract teacher assignment as an excluded instrument. The point estimate for the effect of a 10-
pupil reduction in class size is 0.068, very close to the 0.067 in column 3. The estimate of the 
impact of effort becomes noisier, however. This is not because the estimate drops in magnitude 
(in fact, it increases somewhat), but because the standard error increases. The point estimate 
suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in teacher presence would increase overall test score 
by 0.16 standard deviations (standard error: 0.16). We cannot reject equality between the 
parameter estimates with and without controlling for assignment to the ETP teacher (e.g., 
between columns 3 and 4), although given the noise in the estimate, this test has low power. 16 
Another way to state this result is that the over-identification tests for the specification in the 
columns that are actually over-identified never rejects the validity of the joint set of instruments. 
Not surprisingly given these results, the point estimate of the direct contract teacher effect 
conditional on effort is actually negative (although small and insignificant). Overall, this 
specification, combined with the over-identification test in columns 1-3, gives us some 
confidence that ignoring other effects of the ETP contract teacher dummy does not lead us to 
over-estimate the importance of either teacher effort or class size. We find that both matter, 
although class size itself has a lower impact than estimated in other contexts. Going back to the 
main results in section 4.1, the reason the class size effect was muted for students assigned to 
civil-service teachers seems to be that teachers took advantage of the presence of the contract 
teacher to work less. 
4.4   Discussion 
The results discussed above imply that under reasonable assumptions, providing funds to 
PTAs to hire contract teachers is likely to be much more cost effective than hiring of additional 
civil-service teachers by the central government. In particular, given the difference in 
compensation costs between civil-service and PTA contract teachers, and under the assumption 
                                                          
16 We reproduce this analysis in Table A6, adding observations from the schools where the Extra Teacher Program 
was implemented along with tracking of students by initial achievement. While this increases the sample size by 
about 30%, it unfortunately does not increase the precision of the estimates.  
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that civil-service teachers would react to an increase in the pupil-teacher ratio from the hiring of 
an additional civil-service teacher in the same way that they react to the increase in the pupil-
teacher ratio from adding a contract teacher, our point estimates imply that the government 
would need to spend ten times as much on hiring civil-service teachers as on contract teachers to 
achieve the same test score results. Combining these results with those of a companion paper 
(Duflo et al. 2011) suggests that if the government spent $1 on hiring additional contract 
teachers, implementing SBM training, and tracking students by initial achievement, it would 
generate as much of a  test score gain as spending $13 on hiring additional teachers under 
existing institutions. (Section 5 argues that there may also be large dynamic gains from 
improving the long-run quality of the teacher workforce, but the calculations above exclude 
those potential dynamic gains.)  
Several caveats are worth noting, however. First, while we see relatively large learning 
effects in the years contract teachers are present, these effects appear to fade out once students 
are reassigned to regular classes. One year after the program ended and students had gone back 
to being taught by civil service teachers in large classes, most of the effects were no longer 
statistically significant. Such fade-out is not out of line with the decay in test scores observed for 
other early interventions, including India (e.g. Banerjee et al, 2007) and the US (see Cascio and 
Staiger, 2011, for a review), and with rates of fade out estimated in developing countries 
(Andrabi et al. (2011) find that only fifth to a half of learning persists between grades), but 
contrasts with the more persistent effects of tracking that we observed in the same context (Duflo 
et al, 2011). Also note that decay in test score effects does not necessarily imply a comparable 
decay in non-cognitive impacts (see Chetty et al. (2010) for evidence of long-run effects on 
earnings of an early intervention that had only short-run effects on test scores).   Note that if 
there were no long-run effect, hiring teachers on a contract basis would still be attractive on cost 
grounds relative to the alternative of hiring an equivalent number of civil-service teachers. 
It should also be noted that, while we find positive and significant effects of SBM training 
on test scores in the context of the main ETP program, the estimated effects were smaller and not 
statistically significant in the tracking program (results are available upon request). This may 
merely reflect the more limited scope for improvement under that program: the tracking program 
already increases teacher effort (at least in the top track), probably living little scope to further 
increase effort and test scores. 
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 Finally, our results should be interpreted as the impact of supplementing a civil service 
system with locally-hired contract teachers, brought in on a probationary basis, with the 
expectation of eventually obtaining a civil-service position, not as the impact of replacing a civil 
service teacher system with a system based entirely on local hiring of contract teachers. The 
contract teachers we study likely worked hard in part because they believed this would help them 
obtain a civil service position, and, as discussed in the next section, about half of the contract 
teachers in our study eventually obtained civil-service positions by the end of our study period, 
with better-performing teachers more likely to obtain these positions. 
 
5. Dynamic Effects of Local Contract Teacher Hiring  
The results in section 4  suggest that in the short run, moving from a system of education in 
which teachers are immediately given tenure and managed solely through centralized state-run 
institutions, to a system in which teachers are initially hired locally on temporary contracts 
before becoming eligible for TSC positions and local PTAs are trained in how to recruit and 
monitor teachers, would not only save roughly 75% on teacher salaries during this initial phase 
but also significantly strengthen incentives for teachers and produce better learning outcomes. 
However, the long-run impact of adding a new phase to the career of teachers in which they 
are hired locally on short-run contracts before obtaining a civil-service positions depends not 
only on the relative performance of civil-service teachers and contract teachers at a given point 
in time, but also on how local hiring of contract teachers affects the teacher workforce over time.  
Understanding this requires understanding which contract teachers transition to civil-service jobs 
and how PTA committees select and retain contract teachers. One concern is that 
decentralization may lead to nepotism – for example, Durante et al. (2011) find that a 1998 
reform that increased autonomy by local university officials in Italy resulted, in some areas, in a 
significant increase in the incidence of nepotism towards relatives. 
In this section, we first present evidence that contract teachers whose students performed 
well were more likely to be hired as civil-service teachers, suggesting potential dynamic benefits 
from a local contract teacher hiring program. However, maximizing these benefits requires 
selecting the best contract teachers. Teachers on PTA hiring committees may wish to transfer 
rents toward relatives by offering them contract teacher positions, which may lead to civil-
service positions paid above market-clearing wages; those relative may perform less well once 
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they have obtained a position, both because of weaker selection and because of weaker 
incentives. Providing these rents is relatively cheap. Since the central government typically posts 
new civil-service hires to schools other than the school where they worked as contract teachers, 
schools hiring contract teachers do not bear the long-run consequences of hiring relatives with 
low motivation or talent for teaching. In fact, many PTA committees hired relatives of existing 
teachers, particularly in schools with a high proportion of male teachers. These relatives were 
present and teaching less often than other contract teachers, and their students scored lower on 
tests. Point estimates suggest that SBM training, which was designed to empower parents, 
reduced hiring of teachers’ relatives, and that those relatives hired under SBM were present and 
teaching in class more often and their students learned more, compared to teacher relatives hired 
without SBM.   
 
5.1 Potential Dynamic Impact of Contract Teachers on Teacher Workforce 
To see the potential of contract teacher programs to channel good teachers into civil-service 
positions, note that by the beginning of year 3, the year after the program ended, 47% of the 
initial contract teachers had been hired by the TSC (Table 5, Column 7).17 Experience (a proxy 
for cohort) was an important driver of TSC hiring. But holding experience and school quality 
constant, contract teachers whose students had good scores were more likely to be hired by the 
TSC. A one standard deviation increase in student performance increases the likelihood that the 
ETP teacher was absorbed by the TSC by 34 percentage points (Table 5, column 7).   Students of 
contract teachers hired by the TSC scored 0.32 standard deviations greater than their counterparts 
who had teachers who were not hired by the TSC.18 This 0.32 standard deviations can plausibly 
be considered a lower bound on the difference in teacher value added between those hired by the 
TSC and those not hired, since students of teachers hired by the TSC presumably experienced 
some disruption from changing teachers and the replacement teachers were presumably typically 
of lower skill than those hired by the TSC.19 
                                                          
17 Data on the contract teacher are missing for 2 of 70 program schools. 
18 This estimate was obtained through an OLS regression run on the subset of students assigned to the ETP contact 
teacher. We regress students’ endline score on a dummy equal to 1 if the ETP teacher was hired by TSC within 2 
years of the ETP program start, controlling for the same student and school level controls as in column 3 of Table 2. 
The coefficient is 0.32 and the standard error is 0.11.   
19 Among contract teachers hired by the TSC, 40% were hired in the course of their first year as ETP teachers, 35% 
were hired in the course of their second ETP year, and 25% were hired right after they completed their second ETP 
year. This means that we have little power to examine the difference in test scores between students of teachers who 
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It seems likely that benchmark competition between contract teachers and existing civil 
service teachers was responsible for the tendency for teachers with better scores to obtain TSC 
positions. Indeed, there was no relationship between student test scores and teacher hiring by the 
TSC in the schools where students were tracked by initial performance, which presumably made 
it more difficult to measure contract teacher performance.      
Gordon, Kane, and Staiger (2006) estimate that in Los Angeles, dropping the bottom 
quartile of teachers after their first year of teaching would increase the average impact of 
retained teachers by 1.5 percentile points. This would be partially offset by the need to increase 
the flow of new teachers into the system and thus the increased proportion of novice teachers, so 
the net increase in student test score gains would be 1.2 percentile points per year. In our context, 
the potential benefits of a system in which new teachers initially work as contract teachers are far 
greater, for two reasons. First, the gap in teacher effectiveness appears larger – as discussed 
above, the gap we observe in our data between the students of the roughly 50% of ETP teachers 
that were hired into the TSC and the students of those not hired is 0.32 standard deviations, even 
though performance was not the only criterion used by TSC when hiring.  Second, the negative 
novice teacher effect is counteracted by a positive contract teacher effect, as seen in Section 4.   
To get a sense of how big the total effect might be, suppose teachers work for 27 years. (The 
standard retirement age for civil servants in Kenya is 55 and contract teachers in our sample are 
27 years old on average.) If new entrants to the profession worked three years as a contract 
teacher and half were subsequently hired as civil service teachers, then 20% of the teaching force 
would be made up of contract teachers in steady state. The proportion of novices in the system 
would double from 1 in 30 to 2 in 30, bringing down average scores by 0.065/30 or 0.0022 
standard deviations. Assuming that students of experienced contract teachers score 0.275 
standard deviations more than students of their civil-service teacher counterparts (Column 3 of 
Table 4, row 16), this effect would boost average test scores by 0.275 x 0.2  – 0.0022 = 0.0523 
standard deviations. (Note that this includes the impact of any class size reduction due to the 
additional contract teachers.) The 80% of the teacher workforce made up of civil service teachers 
would have scored, while on contract, 0.32 standard deviations more than their counterparts who 
were not hired into the civil service. If we assume that only half of this effect persists once they 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
were hired by the TSC after the endline test and students of teachers who were never hired by the TSC, but we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that this difference is also 0.32 standard deviations. 
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become civil-service teachers,20 students of teachers hired into the civil service would in the long 
run score 0.16 standard deviations more than those who were not hired into the TSC. Since 80% 
of teachers would be TSC teachers, the gain in tests scores among students overall from 
improved quality of the TSC workforce is 0.16 X 0.8 = 0.13 standard deviations. Overall, the 
gain would be approximately 0.052+ 0.13 = 0.182 standard deviations.21 
The analysis above assumes that the entire gain in student performance documented in 
section 4 for contract teachers is due to their exerting higher effort in response to stronger 
incentives and therefore does not persist once they become civil servants. However, it could also 
reflect positive selection among those initially hired as contract teachers compared to civil 
servants, which would mean some of the effect would persist, in which case our 0.182 standard 
deviation estimate above should be interpreted as a lower bound. To obtain an upper bound of 
the possible effect, if the entire test score gain in section 4 were due to selection rather than 
incentives, then in steady state rather than only roughly 20% of the teaching workforce 
generating the test score gain we observe among students of ETP teachers, 100% would, 
increasing the estimated effect by an additional 0.22 standard deviations, for a total gain of 
approximately 0.4 standard deviation.22 
Of course we cannot measure all potential channels of dynamic impact. Incentives to 
become a teacher could potentially either increase or decrease under a system in which teachers 
initially were hired on a contract basis by local PTAs.  As discussed earlier, under the current 
system, civil-service teacher wages are held far above market clearing levels by the politically 
powerful teachers union. This motivates many to train as teachers. Jobs are rationed by queuing. 
Those entering teacher training college currently can expect several years of unemployment.  
Replacing a period of unemployment with a period of contract teaching at low wages could 
potentially increase the net present value of becoming a teacher. On the other hand, entering 
teacher training college will be less attractive to the extent prospective teacher training students 
                                                          
20 The literature on the inter-temporal stability of teacher effectiveness is mostly based on US data. Raw correlations 
are around 0.3-0.4. See McCaffrey et al. (2009) and Goldhaber and Hansen (2008). Using multiple years of data to 
reduce the noise coming from variation in students, McCaffrey et al. (2009) estimate within-teacher correlation in 
value-added ranging from 0.5 in elementary grades to 0.8 in middle grades. 
21 Note that this calculation interprets the novice teacher effect as causal. The true novice teacher effect could be 
different but this would have a relatively minor effect on the overall calculation. 
22 Note that another reason this figure should be considered an upper bound is that it is based on comparing contract 
teachers to civil-service teachers who teach the lower grades and thus may not be representative of civil-service 
teachers as a whole.  
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fear that they will perform badly as contract teachers and therefore will not eventually obtain 
civil-service positions.23  
It is also possible that there is complementarity or substitutability between teacher value 
added and the incentive system, so the gap in performance between teachers under civil-service 
contracts could be either smaller or larger than under short-term contracts. 
 
5.2 Selection and Retention of Contract Teachers: Teacher Rent Seeking 
and Parents’ Empowerment 
Realizing the full dynamic benefit of contract teacher programs requires hiring and retaining 
good contract teachers and getting rid of bad teachers.  As noted above, when civil-service 
positions open up, contract teachers typically have to switch schools to obtain them. To the 
extent that it reveals information, hiring and retaining a good contract teacher thus potentially 
generates positive externalities for other schools. However, since contract teachers often become 
civil-service teachers, hiring contract teachers may provide opportunities to allocate rents. 
As background, in Kenya, those with formal sector jobs often face strong pressure from 
members of their extended families to help them obtain such jobs as well. This pressure may be 
particularly strong for males, because Kenya is a patrilocal society and contract teachers are 
overwhelmingly hired from the local area, so a greater proportion of male teachers will be local 
to the area of the school and will have relatives from the area interested in applying for the job. 
Moreover, women are considered to have fewer obligations towards their birth family when they 
marry into a new family. 
To understand the factors influencing hiring and retention of contract teachers it is useful to 
consider the following framework. Suppose PTA hiring committees can be motivated both by a 
desire to obtain rents for relatives and a desire to improve student performance. We assume that 
among the members of the PTA, parents put relatively more weight on maximizing student 
performance, while teachers (particularly male teachers) put more weight on delivering rents to 
their relatives. Insofar as SBM training empowers parents within the PTA committee, it will 
reduce the weight PTA committees place on delivering rents to relatives of teachers.  
                                                          
23 While in general equilibrium if programs to fund PTAs to hire locally on temporary contracts were expanded to 
cover all of the schools in the area, the pool of potential contract teachers would be somewhat reduced, this effect is 
likely small as two thirds of schools in the area were provided funds to hire contract teachers either through this 
program or the tracking program described in Duflo et al. (2011), and contract teachers in the program were drawn 
from the local area. 
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Suppose that PTA hiring committees receive applications and can obtain observable 
information such as sex, education, and experience along with an imperfect signal of teacher 
quality. Suppose also that teachers can supply additional information on their relatives creating a 
force leading to a potentially positive impact of hiring relatives. Once teachers have been hired, 
school committees obtain additional information on their performance, and decide whether to 
renew their contract and more generally how to manage them, and civil-service teachers may 
continue to act to deliver rents to relatives. Relatives set effort knowing this. 
The combined effects of information and rent seeking on aggregate hiring of relatives and on 
the relative test scores of students of relatives of existing civil-service teachers are ambiguous, 
but this framework suggests that SBM should unambiguously reduce hiring of relatives, 
particularly those hired due to rent seeking motives as opposed to those hired based on positive 
information provided by teachers working at the school. Moreover, if it is politically more 
difficult for teachers on PTA committees to fire teacher relatives, then in equilibrium we might 
see lower effort among those relatives (due to lower incentives), but may increase equilibrium 
effort among teacher relatives working as contract teachers. Test scores of students of relatives 
should be higher under SBM than without it. We have limited power to test these predictions due 
to the small sample size, but the evidence we do have is consistent with the predictions.  
 
Hiring of Relatives 
Overall, 26% of contract teachers hired through the ETP program were relatives of existing 
teachers in the school. Relatives of civil-service teachers were much less likely to be hired in 
schools with SBM:  the share of relatives among contract teachers fell from 31% in non-SBM 
schools to about half that (16%) in SBM schools (Table 5, column 5; the t-statistic on the SBM 
effect is only 1.5 due to the limited sample size, but a similar SBM effect was observed in 
tracking schools, suggesting this is not coincidence.) 
One frequent concern with empowerment program is the risk of local capture: empowering 
parents within PTA might merely lead to a bias towards locals, perhaps with a strong ethnic 
component. However, there is no evidence that the SBM program led to a shift in favoritism 
from relatives of teachers to locals. On the contrary, point estimates suggest SBM schools were 
12 percentage points less likely to hire contract teachers from the local area, although the 
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difference is not significant given the small sample size (see Column 4, Table 5.).24 More 
generally, it seems that SBM training increased the transparency of the contract-teacher 
recruiting process. SBM schools advertised for the position more broadly and interviewed more 
candidates (results available upon request). 
 
Performance-based Retention 
As we noted (and is clear from Table 5, column 7), teachers who performed well were more 
likely to be absorbed by the TSC. We also see that PTAs were more likely to retain more 
effective teachers (among those who were not hired by the TSC).25  Overall, 19% of contract 
teachers left their school (for reasons other than having obtained a TSC position) before the end 
of the program and had to be replaced. Teachers whose students’ had poor endline performance 
were more likely to be replaced, with a one standard deviation reduction in test scores associated 
with a 24 percentage point increase in the chance of early departure (Table 5, column 6).  
Even more telling (since the low performance of the students may have been caused by the 
early departure, rather than the other way around) is what happened at the end of the program. 
The funds for the program stopped, but PTA could raise their own funds to continue it. Schools 
with the SBM program (which increased the overall learning impact of the ETP program) were 
more likely to retain contract teachers into year 3. While 25% of the non-SBM schools in which 
the contract teacher was not absorbed by the TSC kept the contract teacher on board after the 
ICS subsidy ended, this figure was 48% among SBM schools (see Table 5, column 8). The 
finding that parents were twice as likely to pay to continue the ETP program when they had 
stronger governance rights is dramatic. We cannot distinguish the direct channel of parents being 
more willing to raise funds for a program because they felt they had a greater role in governance 
from the indirect channel of governance improving program performance and this in turn 
increasing willingness to pay.    
Finally, among teachers not hired by the TSC, PTAs were more likely to retain good 
teachers:  a one standard deviation increase in student scores is associated with a 43 percentage 
point higher likelihood of  retention as a PTA teacher for teachers who were not hired by the 
TSC in year 3 (Table 5, column 9). Interestingly, this correlation entirely disappears for teachers 
who are relative of the teachers in the schools, consistent with the lower incentives they face 
                                                          
24 SBM schools were also less likely to hire someone related to a pupil or parent (data not shown). 
25 School committees never explicitly voted against renewing a contract. 
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(results available upon request).   Column 9 in Table 5 shows that relatives are not less likely to 
be retained, despite worse performance, so conditional on performance, relatives are more likely 
to be retained. 
 
Teacher effort and student performance 
The framework above suggests that teachers’ relatives hired under SBM should perform 
better than teacher relatives hired in the absence of SBM, both because SBM should reduce rent 
seeking while continuing to allow information flows and thus should improve selection of 
teachers, and because SBM schools may be better able to monitor and incentivize those relatives 
of existing civil-service teachers who are hired. Looking at students’ tests scores in column 1 of 
Table 6, we estimate both the main effect of being taught by an ETP teacher who is a relative of 
an existing teacher, and an interaction between SBM and this variable. We do find that relatives 
perform less well than non-relatives: the point estimate of the “teacher relative” effect on test 
scores is – 0.339 in non-SBM schools (significant at the 10% level).  This indicates that hiring 
relatives must to some extent be a way to share rents, and is inefficient from society’s point of 
view. The SBM program entirely undoes this effect however: the interaction is +0.385 standard 
deviations (significant at the 5% level). Taken together, these numbers imply that in SBM 
schools the total “teacher relative effect” is statistically undistinguishable from zero, consistent 
with hypothesis that SBM undoes the tendency either to select weak relatives or to let relatives 
get away with low effort.   
Similarly, the point estimates in column 4 of Table 6 suggest that contract teachers who are 
relatives of civil-service teachers are less likely to be in class teaching, but that this tendency is 
mitigated by the SBM program. Coefficients are large in magnitude and are significant at the 
10% level.  
The framework also suggests that if existing civil-service teachers are female, rent seeking 
will be lower but that information channels should still operate, leading to better performance of 
relatives of females. The data is consistent with this: fewer teacher relatives were hired in 
schools with a higher fraction of females among civil-service teachers in lower grades (Table 5, 
column 5), and students of relatives hired as ETP teachers learned more in those schools (Table 
6, column 1, significant at the 10% level). Point estimates suggest they were present and teaching 
in class more often (Table 6, column 4). 
28
 
 
Combining these estimates with the IV estimate in Table 4 can help us determine whether the 
SBM effect on test score for students taught by teacher relatives can mainly be attributed to 
higher effort, or to higher skills conditional on effort. Absence from class among ETP teachers 
who are relatives in non-SBM schools is 24 percentages points higher than among relatives in 
SBM schools (Table 6, column 4). Taking the estimated effect of teacher effort from Table 4, 
column 4 (which is entirely identified from the difference in the performance of the students of 
the TSC teachers), this implies a 0.24 X 1.60=0.38 standard deviation gap in test scores between 
students of relatives in non-SBM schools and students of relatives in SBM schools. This line up 
quite well with the 0.32 standard deviation in test scores observed in Table 6, column 1 (students 
of relatives in non-SBM Schools scores -0.339 and students of relatives in SBM schools scored  
–0.065–0.339+0.385= –0.019, for a difference of 0.32). Although the standard errors around 
these estimates are large, their comparable order of magnitudes suggests that the SBM effect on 
contract teachers related to TSC teachers is primarily mediated by effort (whether due to 
monitoring or to selection of harder working relatives).  
 
5.3 Discussion 
Hiring new teachers by local school committees on temporary contracts and then promoting 
them to civil service positions based on performance has the potential not only to reduce salary 
costs, but also to improve learning both in the short run, and in the long run by improving the 
teacher workforce. However, to achieve the full benefits of such a program, it will be important 
to combine it with SBM training, to empower parents and reduce rent seeking on behalf both of 
existing teachers (who, in our experiments, reduced the effect of the program by reducing their 
own effort in the schools were there was no SBM training), and to limit the extent to which 
(possibly) weak relatives of existing (male) teachers are hired and promoted regardless of their 
performance. From a methodological standpoint, our analysis suggests a way to measure 
disproportionate hiring of relatives. While there are legitimate reasons to hire relatives, 
comparing hiring and performance of relatives hired under different institutional environments 
provides a way to measure this form of corruption. 
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6.   Conclusion 
Efforts to improve education in developing countries often focus either on providing additional 
resources, typically by hiring more teachers to bring down class size, or on governance reform. 
We examine two popular approaches: decentralized hiring of contract teachers, meant to 
decrease pupil-teacher ratios at low cost while at the same time strengthening teacher incentives 
through local control; and School-Based Management training programs, designed to empower 
parents. We examine these two types of programs in Kenya, and find that they can work as 
complements. In the absence of parents’ empowerment, the additional resources brought about 
by a contract teacher program are partly captured by the existing civil-servants teachers in two 
ways. First, civil-service teachers reduce effort, which undoes the positive impact of class size 
reduction for their students. Second, they seek to capture rents by hiring relatives, whose 
students perform less well than students of other contract teachers. Empowering parents through 
a short training session mitigates both these negative effects. First, in schools with SBM training, 
civil-service teachers were more likely to be present in class and teaching; second, in those 
schools, relatives of civil-service teachers were less likely to be hired as contract teachers; third, 
those relatives who were hired anyway performed as well as non-relatives (which could come 
from better selection of the remaining relatives, or stronger incentives).    
Our results suggest that in the presence of weak institutions, increases in resources may be 
undermined by the behavioral responses of existing providers.  However, local governance offers 
the potential to translate increased resources into better outcomes.  In particular, programs 
devolving authority to hire teachers on short-term contracts have potential both to improve test 
scores in the short run and to improve the quality of the teaching labor force in the long run. But 
details matter: small differences in program design (e.g., a few hours of SBM training) can 
substantially affect outcomes.   
In this light it is worth considering two related studies. A large-scale randomized study in 
India contemporary to ours (Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2010) finds that adding contract 
teachers (hired without a promise of regularization) to government-run primary schools leads to 
average test score gains very similar to those we observe. 
On the other hand, preliminary results from a study following up on ours (Bold et al., 2012), 
also in Kenya, suggest that the impact of contract teacher hiring is indeed sensitive to the 
institutional context and whether the program is executed as designed.  A contract teacher 
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program in which administration was contracted out to an NGO which made payments to school 
committees to hire teachers yielded learning gains similar to those we found. But in a variant in 
which payments to schools were made through the district offices of the Ministry of Education (a 
separate institution from the TSC, which normally handles payments to civil-service teachers), 
contract teacher positions were less likely to be filled, monthly payments to teachers were often 
seriously late (the average delay was 2.33 months and 10% of teachers waited 10 months to be 
paid) and the program did not significantly improve test scores.  Bold et al (2012) argue that part 
but not all of the difference is accounted for by the unfilled vacancies and the late salary 
payments.  As discussed below, the Kenyan government eventually established a contract teacher 
program, and under its agreement with the teachers’ union, contract teachers were promised 
civil-service positions. One possible explanation for the differing program effects found by Bold 
et al (2012) is that some teachers in the government program may have expected to be hired as 
civil servants independent of their job performance.26  
A classic objection to decentralization and local control is that it may lead to capture by local 
elites. We indeed find evidence of such capture, but in our context, capture is not by local gentry 
or high caste landowners, but rather by the local representatives of the central state itself.  Kenya 
has long had efforts to devolve control, for example through district-based planning. However, 
these have taken place within the context of a centralized state without local elected legislatures.  
Our analysis suggests that unless such initiatives are combined with institutional reforms to 
allow democratic control at the local level, local agents of the state may use devolution to 
capture rents. Kenya's new Constitution, overwhelmingly approved by voters, combines 
decentralization with the creation of new elected legislatures at the local level.  
Methodologically, our results also have implications for the literature on corruption, 
governance, and ethnic conflict. Much of the recent literature in economics on corruption focuses 
on financial corruption – taking bribes or stealing state funds, for example. Yet we would argue 
that obligations to relatives often conflict with obligations to the state, or to employers more 
generally, and that favoring relatives is a widespread form of corruption.  
It is also a form of corruption that interacts closely with ethnic politics. When civil servants 
receive rents in the form of above market wages, enjoy civil-service protection and thus long-
term employment, and can in turn influence the hiring of other civil servants, favoritism toward 
                                                          
26 Our paper differs from both these studies in the randomized allocation of students to either contract or civil-
service teachers; the SBM program; and the separate IV estimation of pupil-teacher ratio and teacher effort effects 
based on randomized allocation of students and of SBM.  
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relatives can launch a dynamic process of growth of a network of coethnics within the state. Our 
analysis suggests that altruism towards those family members (or greater ability to enforce 
reciprocity within the family) could be one reason why politics in much of Africa is often 
defined by ethnic cleavage, rather than any other arbitrary variable (such as religion or class). 
Since marriage in the society we study is primarily within ethnic group, relatives will 
overwhelmingly be coethnics, and since the society is patrilineal, relatives of males will be 
coethnics. In societies in which only a minority have the educational qualifications required for 
most civil-service jobs, networks of co-ethnics with sufficient education to qualify for these jobs 
may be tight enough that individuals benefit indirectly from hiring of unrelated coethnics. 
 What are the political prospects for local hiring of contract teachers? While teacher unions 
are likely to resist efforts to reduce their members’ wages, they may be willing to compromise on 
a system in which existing members are protected, but new entrants to the teaching profession 
are first hired on short-term contracts at lower pay, and then are eventually brought in as civil-
service employees. Under some standard models of union bargaining in which unions can set or 
negotiate wages and benefits but the government controls total hiring of new civil-service 
teachers, some teacher training college graduates who are willing to work at less than the 
government’s reservation value but will not be hired. One possible solution would be for the 
government to hire these teachers outside union rules at a lower wage. Ex post, this would be 
statically efficient. One problem, from the union’s point of view, is that the government may not 
be able to commit not to use the fact that it expects to hire teachers on this basis in its wage 
negotiations with the teachers union. Moreover, the government could simply replace TSC 
teachers with PTA teachers over time.  To avoid this, the government would have to commit to 
limit the number of contract teachers hired over time. One way to do this would be through an 
“up or out” system in which the workers outside the union bargaining agreement have to be 
either hired as civil servants or fired after a certain time. A key issue would be to ensure that the 
selection process maintains the positive correlation with student performance found in our 
sample.  
 “Up or Out” systems are of course common in the higher education labor market in the 
United States. Short-term contracts prior to long-term jobs have also been a feature of some 
European labor market reforms. It is possible that such arrangements could be part of reforms of 
education markets in developing countries with strong unions. Murgai and Pritchett (2006) 
proposed essentially such a system for India.  
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Subsequent to our study, the Kenyan government, which had long had a freeze on hiring of 
new civil-service teachers, hired 18,000 contract teachers. Initial plans included no guarantee of 
civil-service employment afterwards. However, the Kenyan National Union of Teachers opposed 
the initial plans and under the eventual agreement, contract teachers were hired at much higher 
salaries than in the program we study, hiring was done under civil-service rules heavily 
weighting the cohort in which applicants graduated from teacher training college rather than the 
judgment of local school committees, and contract teachers hired under the program were 
promised civil-service positions.  Our analysis suggests that these features could potentially 
undermine both the incentive and selection effects of local hiring of contract teachers by PTAs.  
Understanding the selection and incentive impacts of this program, and of potential program 
variants, is an important topic for future research. 
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(3)
p-value
( 1) = (2)
Panel A. School Characteristics Prior to Program Inception Mean SD Mean SD
Points on 2004 national exam (out of 400) 256 24 258 23 0.676
Total student enrollment, 2004 598 241 611 246 0.759
Number of TSC teachers, 2004 12.4 4.1 12.0 3.8 0.537
Proportion of female teachers among TSC teachers, 2004 0.71 0.46 0.67 0.47 0.428
Years of experience among TSC teachers, 2004 17.04 9.26 15.84 9.63 0.197
Average age among TSC teachers, 2004 43.17 8.49 42.18 9.11 0.258
School-level pupil/teacher ratio, 2004 48.7 14.3 53.8 33.4 0.245
Average enrollment in grade 1, March 2005 95 41 94 37 0.902
Proportion of female grade 1 students, March 2005 0.51 0.06 0.49 0.06 0.165
Average enrollment in grade 2, March 2005 97 43 99 40 0.798
Class-based (rather than subject-based) assignment of TSC teachersa 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.21 0.703
Panel B. After Program Inception
Average class size in grade 1, October 2005 81.5 27 43.6 18 0.000
Class-based (rather than subject-based) assignment of TSC teachers 0.05 0.22 0.18 0.39 0.019
If subject-based assignment: number of TSC teachers for grade 1 3.53 1.07 3.54 1.13 0.955
Average class size in grade 2, March 2006 68 25 42 18 0.000
Number of streams in grade 2, March 2006 1.39 0.60 2.29 0.63 0.000
Number of streams in grade 1, March 2006 1.03 0.17 1.00 0.00 0.145
Panel D. Comparability of Grade 1 Sections (ETP schools only)
p-value
( 1) = (2)
Proportion of female teachers 0.48 0.50 0.66 0.47 0.010
Teachers' Years of experience 1.50 0.96 15.54 9.63 0.000
Teachers' Age 27.28 3.60 42.02 9.11 0.000
Proportion of female grade 1 students 0.49 0.07 0.49 0.08 0.841
Students' age 7.68 0.50 7.64 0.48 0.639
Standardized baseline score (Mean 0, SD 1 at school level) 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.10 0.355
Standardized endline score (Mean 0, SD 1 at school level) 0.08 0.22 -0.07 0.20 0.000
Notes: Data from 70 comparison schools and 70 ETP treatment schools. Standard deviations in italics.
Table 1. Schools, Teachers and Students Characteristics, by Treatment Group, Pre- and Post-Program 
Comparison
Schools
ETP Treatment 
Schools
a Under "class-based assignment" of teachers, each teacher is assigned a specific class for which she teaches all subjects
(math, reading, etc.). Under "subject-based assignment" of teachers, each teacher is assigned a specific subset of subjects and
teaches those subjects in multiple classes and/or grades.
Taught by ETP 
Contract Teachers
Taught by TSC 
Teachers
(1) (2)
37
Table 2. Endline Test Scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) ETP school 0.087 0.074 0.073 0.051 0.015 0.102 0.111
(0.098) (0.088) (0.088) (0.078) (0.073) (0.111) (0.096)
(2) ETP school x SBM 0.125 0.130 0.130 0.182 0.186 0.050 0.055
(0.118) (0.106) (0.106) (0.093)* (0.086)** (0.133) (0.117)
(3) ETP school x assigned to ETP contract teacher 0.207 0.228 0.241 0.251 0.260 0.128 0.178
(0.064)*** (0.058)*** (0.066)*** (0.058)*** (0.062)*** (0.070)* (0.069)**
(4) -0.156 -0.174 -0.169 -0.213 -0.224 -0.076 -0.088
(0.095) (0.085)** (0.083)** (0.095)** (0.087)** (0.095) (0.085)
(5) School size (/100) -0.055 -0.051 -0.201 0.089
(0.088) (0.088) (0.075)*** (0.096)
(6) Share female among TSC teachers 0.502 0.497 0.307 0.567
(0.104)*** (0.104)*** (0.093)*** (0.107)***
(7) Average years of experience (/10) among TSC teachers 0.021 0.020 -0.017 0.049
(0.067) (0.068) (0.058) (0.070)
(8) Girl 0.056 0.056 -0.013 0.106
(0.023)** (0.023)** (0.021) (0.026)***
(9) Age -0.043 -0.043 -0.007 -0.065
(0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.011) (0.013)***
(10) Baseline score 0.498 0.498 0.497 0.401
(0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.015)*** (0.022)***
(11) Teacher has <1 year of experience -0.065 -0.012 -0.100
(0.091) (0.085) (0.107)
(12) Observations 6531 6531 6531 6531 6531 6534 6534
(13) R-squared 0.030 0.250 0.250 0.030 0.250 0.030 0.180
(14) Total effect: ETP school+SBM 0.212 0.204 0.203 0.233 0.201 0.152 0.166
p-val (ETP School + SBM = 0 ) 0.056* 0.036** 0.036** 0.01** 0.016** 0.204 0.110
(15) Total effect: ETP school+contract teacher 0.294 0.302 0.314 0.302 0.275 0.230 0.289
p-val (ETP school +contact teacher = 0 ) 0.006*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.045** 0.009***
(16) Total effect: ETP school+SBM+contract teacher 0.263 0.258 0.275 0.271 0.237 0.204 0.256
p-val (ETP school +SBM +contract teacher = 0 ) 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.001*** 0.007*** 0.048** 0.019**
Notes: OLS regressions. Endline test was administered after the program had been in place for five school terms. Scores are normalized such
that the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group are zero and one, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the school
level in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. There are only 139 schools/clusters because
tests could not be administered in one of the ETP schools. Region and date of test dummies were included in all regressions but are not shown. 
Total Score Math Score Literacy Score
ETP school x SBM x assigned to ETP contract 
    teacher
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Table 3. Teacher Effort and Pedagogy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Data Source:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(1) ETP school -0.129 -0.009 -0.145 0.033 0.155 -0.025 0.073 -0.238 -0.224 -0.145
(0.040)*** (0.025) (0.042)*** (0.015)** (0.081)* (0.018) (0.123) (0.128)* (0.124)* (0.132)
(2) ETP school x SBM 0.075 0.001 0.093 -0.001 0.016 -0.013 -0.089 0.098 -0.008 -0.033
(0.043)* (0.029) (0.050)* (0.029) (0.087) (0.012) (0.141) (0.143) (0.141) (0.149)
(3) ETP school x ETP contract teacher 0.278 0.057 0.294 -0.032 -0.015 0.001 0.165 -0.078 -0.356 -0.165
(0.047)*** (0.043) (0.050)*** (0.028) (0.080) (0.016) (0.131) (0.133) (0.111)*** (0.146)
(4) ETP school x ETP contract teacher x SBM 0.029 0.092 -0.063 -0.006 -0.035 -0.001 -0.024 -0.032 0.157 0.149
(0.065) (0.049)* (0.073) (0.042) (0.113) (0.017) (0.165) (0.188) (0.149) (0.196)
(5) Years of experience teaching 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001)* (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
(6) < 1 year of experience teaching 0.001 -0.067 0.065 0.117 -0.050 -0.009 -0.187 -0.009 -0.059 0.109
(0.074) (0.046) (0.064) (0.091) (0.081) (0.014) (0.157) (0.170) (0.179) (0.170)
(7) Female 0.054 0.004 0.066 -0.037 0.004 0.016 0.093 0.043 0.127 0.096
(0.028)* (0.021) (0.029)** (0.026) (0.045) (0.010) (0.079) (0.089) (0.079) (0.086)
(8) Log  # of teachers involved in the grade -0.016 -0.136 0.105
(0.040) (0.041)*** (0.046)**
(9) Observations 1957 1957 1636 168 168 168 165 166 165 165
(10) Mean in comparison schools 0.579 0.840 0.688 0.012 0.154 0.044 0.597 0.742 0.726 0.677
(11) Total effect: ETP school+SBM -0.054 -0.008 -0.052 0.032 0.171 -0.038 -0.016 -0.140 -0.232 -0.178
p-val (ETP School + SBM = 0 ) 0.182 0.772 0.283 0.241 0.002*** 0.127 0.894 0.203 0.041** 0.126
(12) Total effect: ETP school+contract teacher 0.149 0.048 0.149 0.001 0.140 -0.024 0.238 -0.316 -0.580 -0.310
p-val (ETP school +contact teacher = 0 ) 0.007*** 0.234 0.008*** 0.966 0.014** 0.364 0.064* 0.024** 0*** 0.015**
(13) Total effect: ETP school+SBM+contract tea 0.253 0.141 0.179 -0.006 0.121 -0.038 0.125 -0.250 -0.431 -0.194
p-val (ETP school +SBM +contract teach    0*** 0*** 0.002*** 0.819 0.048** 0.136 0.395 0.135 0.002*** 0.189
Notes: Standard errors clustered at school level. Region and date of visit dummies included in all regressions but not shown. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels respectively.
Columns 1-3: Linear probability model regressions. Multiple observations per teacher. 
Columns 4-10: In each school, two or three grade 1 teachers (including the ETP teacher in ETP schools) were selected for classroom observation and for an interview. OLS regressions
in columns 4-6 and LPM regressions in columns 7-10.
Teacher 
had a 
lesson 
plan 
prepared 
for the 
class
Unannounced Spot Checks Classroom Observations
Teacher 
Found in 
Class 
Teaching
Teacher 
Present at 
School
If Present at 
School: 
Found in 
Class 
Teaching
Share of 
Students 
Who Went 
to 
Blackboard 
to Write an 
Answer
Share of 
Students 
Who 
Answered a 
Question
Share of 
Students 
Who Asked 
a Question
Teacher Interviews
Teacher did 
not have 
time to mark 
individual 
work for 
children
Teacher 
reports not 
having time 
to help 
children 
individually
Teacher 
reports not 
having 
time to pay 
attention to 
slow 
learners
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Class Size (/100) -0.42 -0.60 -0.64 -0.68 -0.43 -0.50 -0.51 -0.69 -0.33 -0.58 -0.62 -0.51
(0.20)** (0.26)** (0.24)*** (0.42) (0.18)** (0.23)** (0.22)** (0.45) (0.22) (0.27)** (0.24)** (0.44)
Prob. teacher teaching 0.80 1.31 1.42 1.60 0.93 1.01 1.19 1.95 0.52 1.31 1.35 0.89
(0.30)*** (0.66)** (0.67)** (1.56) (0.28)*** (0.59)* (0.61)* (1.68) (0.29)* (0.64)** (0.64)** (1.71)
ETP teacher -0.06 -0.27 0.16
(0.49) (0.50) (0.53)
Average experience of teachers (/10) 0.14 0.20 0.16 0.06 0.14 0.00 0.18 0.20 0.29
(0.24) (0.25) (0.38) (0.22) (0.23) (0.39) (0.23) (0.24) (0.35)
Square (Average experience of teachers /10) -0.06 -0.08 -0.07 -0.04 -0.07 -0.03 -0.06 -0.07 -0.10
(0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
Share of female teachers 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.33 0.33 0.35
(0.09)*** (0.09)*** (0.10)*** (0.08)** (0.08)*** (0.12) (0.09)***(0.09)*** (0.10)***
Girl 0.06 0.06 0.21 0.18 0.33 0.35
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.08)*** (0.12) (0.09)*** (0.10)***
Age -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.11 0.11
(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)*** (0.03)***
Baseline score 0.49 0.49 -0.46 -0.38 -0.35 -0.40
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.20)** (0.23) (0.11)*** (0.21)*
Observations 6531 6505 6505 6505 6531 6505 6505 6505 6531 6505 6505 6505
Hansen overid P-value 0.57 0.97 0.97 0.36 0.47 0.50 0.88 0.87 0.86
Table 4. Instrumental Variable Estimates of Effect of Class Size and Teacher Effort on Test Scores
Notes: 2SLS estimation where Class size and Probability that Teacher Teaches are endogeneous regressors. First-Stage estimations are presented in Table A4.
Robust standard errors clustered at the school level are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% ,and 10% levels respectively.
Literacy ScoreMath ScoreTotal Score
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Table 5. Contract Teacher Selection, Retention and Promotion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Female
<1 year of 
experience
Previously 
PTA 
teacher at 
the school
Born or 
married 
locally
Relative of 
a teacher in 
the school
Left (not for 
TSC) and had 
to be replaced
Hired by 
TSC during 
or shortly 
after ETP 
program
Employed 
by school by 
beginning of 
year 3
If not hired 
by TSC: 
Employed 
by school by 
beginning of 
year 3
SBM -0.16 0.15 -0.02 -0.12 -0.15 0.02 -0.18 0.23 0.07
(0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12)* (0.19)
Female 0.17 0.04 -0.06 -0.05
(0.09)* (0.11) (0.12) (0.18)
Years of experience 0.05 0.11 -0.19 -0.16
(0.05) (0.06)* (0.06)*** (0.09)*
Relative of a teacher in the school -0.08 -0.07 0.18 0.05
(0.13) (0.15) (0.16) (0.25)
Average presence -0.51 0.24 -0.1 -0.11
(0.19)*** (0.22) (0.24) (0.34)
Mean score of students at endline -0.24 0.34 0.03 0.43
(0.11)** (0.12)*** (0.14) (0.25)*
Prop. TSC teachers female -0.14 -0.06 -0.01 -0.25 -0.48 -0.16 -0.11 0.11 0.1
(0.20) (0.17) (0.16) (0.19) (0.15)*** (0.16) (0.19) (0.20) (0.33)
Average experience among TSC teachers 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)* (0.01)* (0.01) (0.01)*** (0.01)* (0.02)
School performance on 2004 national exam 0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.11 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)* (0.07) (0.08) (0.12)
School Size (/100) -0.04 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)** (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Number of teachers assigned to lower grades 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
School had at least one PTA teacher in 2004 -0.02 -0.26 -0.04 -0.06 -0.17 0.03 0.13 0.18 0.25
(0.15) (0.12)** (0.12) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14) (0.20)
Observations 70 70 68 68 68 68 68 68 42
R-Squared 0.09 0.17 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.35 0.44 0.28 0.31
Mean in schools without SBM 0.53 0.17 0.20 0.74 0.31 0.19 0.47 0.25 0.47
Notes: Sample restricted to the 70 schools sampled for the Extra-Teacher Program. Linear probability model regressions with standard errors presented in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Characteristics of ETP Contract Teacher hired by the PTA What happened to the ETP Contract Teacher?
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Student Performance
Total Endline Score for 
Students assigned to ETP 
teacher
Teacher Present 
at School
If Present at 
School: Found in 
Class Teaching
Teacher Found in 
Class Teaching
School based management (SBM) -0.065 0.019 0.000 0.020
(0.131) (0.042) (0.063) (0.067)
(a) ETP contract teacher is the relative of a TSC teacher -0.339 -0.071 -0.285 -0.277
(0.175)* (0.103) (0.203) (0.143)*
(b) 0.385 0.199 0.124 0.242
(0.165)** (0.096)** (0.173) (0.131)*
Proportion of females among TSC teachers 0.141 0.152 -0.166 -0.019
(0.173) (0.070)** (0.093)* (0.098)
Proportion of females among TSC teachers 0.507 -0.035 0.325 0.237
         x ETP contract teacher is the relative of a TSC teacher (0.261)* (0.117) (0.192)* (0.178)
ETP contract teacher has < 1 year of experience -0.159 -0.055 0.039 -0.017
(0.092)* (0.051) (0.061) (0.076)
Observations 1548 217 192 217
p-val a+b=0 0.770 0.181 0.204 0.794
Mean in schools without SBM 0.845 0.816 0.690
Unit of Observation Student Teacher-Day Teacher-Day Teacher-Day
ETP Contract Teacher's Effort
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Column 1: OLS. Sample restricted to students assigned to ETP contract teachers in ETP schools. Data source: endline test administered by research team. 
Columns 2-4: LPM. Sample restricted to ETP contract teachers in ETP schools. Up to 5 observations per teacher. Data source: Five unnounced spot checks.
SBM x ETP contract teacher is the relative of a TSC teacher
Table 6. "Relative" effect: Performance of ETP Contract Teachers related to existing TSC teachers
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Appendix Table A1: Attrition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Extra-teacher program school -0.024 -0.005 0.003 0.018
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.027)
Extra-teacher program school x school based management -0.016 -0.017 -0.034 -0.035
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.031)
Extra-teacher program school x assigned to contract teacher -0.018 -0.014 -0.029 -0.065
(0.013) (0.017) (0.018) (0.028)**
Extra-teacher program school x assigned to contract teacher x SBM 0.016 -0.021 0.030 0.051
(0.019) (0.028) (0.024) (0.041)
Age -0.022 -0.022 -0.006 -0.006
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)* (0.004)
Girl 0.012 0.012 0.025 0.025
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010)*** (0.011)**
In bottom half of initial distribution 0.009 0.013
(0.012) (0.015)
In bottom half of initial distribution x ETP school -0.015 -0.030
(0.026) (0.029)
In bottom half of initial distribution x ETP school x SBM -0.029 -0.016
(0.034) (0.031)
In bottom half of initial distribution x ETP school x contract teacher -0.018 0.089
(0.034) (0.032)***
In bottom half of initial distribution x ETP school x contract teacher x SBM 0.099 -0.042
(0.051)* (0.051)
Observations 6628 6628 6628 6628
Mean in Comparison Schools 0.184 0.184 0.228 0.228
Total effects
Extra-teacher program school+school based management -0.040 -0.031
p-val (Extra-teacher program school + school based management = 0 ) 0.062* 0.083*
Extra-teacher program school+contract teacher -0.042 -0.026
p-val (Extra-teacher program school +contact teacher = 0 ) 0.036** 0.174
ETP school+SBM+contract teacher -0.042 -0.030
p-val (ETP school +SBM +contract teacher = 0 ) 0.028** 0.034**
Total effects for students in top half of initial distribution
Extra-teacher program school+school based management -0.022 -0.017
p-val (Extra-teacher program school + school based management = 0 ) 0.291 0.390
Extra-teacher program school+contract teacher -0.019 -0.047
p-val (Extra-teacher program school +contact teacher = 0 ) 0.339 0.037**
ETP school+SBM+contract teacher -0.057 -0.031
p-val (ETP school +SBM +contract teacher = 0 ) 0.004*** 0.182
Total effects for students in bottom half of initial distribution: 
Extra-teacher program school+school based management -0.066 -0.063
p-val (Extra-teacher program school + school based management = 0 ) 0.009*** 0.009***
Extra-teacher program school+contract teacher -0.052 0.012
p-val (Extra-teacher program school +contact teacher = 0 ) 0.036** 0.641
ETP school+SBM+contract teacher -0.020 -0.030
p-val (ETP school +SBM +contract teacher = 0 ) 0.433 0.183
Notes: LPM regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the school level are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Attrited at 
Endline Test
(after 19 Months in Program)
Atritted at 
Long-Run Follow-up Test
(a Year after Program Ended)
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Table A2. Lower Bounds for Treatment Effects at Endline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) ETP school 0.036 0.036 -0.012 -0.012 0.071 0.071
(0.086) (0.086) (0.072) (0.072) (0.094) (0.094)
(2) ETP school x SBM 0.107 0.107 0.177 0.177 0.024 0.024
(0.100) (0.100) (0.085)** (0.085)** (0.109) (0.109)
(3) ETP school x assigned to ETP contract teacher 0.176 0.178 0.231 0.225 0.093 0.101
(0.054)*** (0.061)*** (0.051)*** (0.057)*** (0.061) (0.066)
(4) -0.144 -0.143 -0.214 -0.216 -0.054 -0.051
(0.088) (0.087) (0.088)** (0.088)** (0.093) (0.092)
(5) School size (/100) -0.029 -0.029 -0.184 -0.186 0.112 0.114
(0.084) (0.085) (0.074)** (0.074)** (0.091) (0.092)
(6) Share female among TSC teachers 0.458 0.458 0.283 0.285 0.522 0.519
(0.101)*** (0.101)*** (0.092)*** (0.092)*** (0.103)*** (0.103)***
(7) Average years of experience (/10) among TSC teachers 0.020 0.020 -0.017 -0.017 0.049 0.049
(0.064) (0.064) (0.056) (0.056) (0.065) (0.066)
(8) Girl 0.067 0.067 -0.007 -0.007 0.119 0.119
(0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.021) (0.021) (0.025)*** (0.025)***
(9) Age -0.035 -0.035 -0.002 -0.002 -0.057 -0.057
(0.012)*** (0.011)*** (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)*** (0.012)***
(10) Baseline score 0.479 0.479 0.487 0.487 0.377 0.377
(0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)***
(11) Teacher has <1 year of experience -0.007 0.031 -0.041
(0.084) (0.083) (0.098)
(12) Observations 6429 6429 6429 6429 6432 6432
(13) R-squared 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.170 0.170
(14) Total effect: ETP school+SBM 0.143 0.143 0.165 0.165 0.095 0.095
p-val (ETP School + SBM = 0 ) 0.129 0.128 0.048** 0.047** 0.331 0.332
(15) Total effect: ETP school+contract teacher 0.212 0.214 0.219 0.213 0.164 0.172
p-val (ETP school +contact teacher = 0 ) 0.015** 0.024** 0.007*** 0.014** 0.076* 0.083*
(16) Total effect: ETP school+SBM+contract teacher 0.175 0.178 0.182 0.174 0.134 0.145
p-val (ETP school +SBM +contract teacher = 0 ) 0.043** 0.063* 0.019** 0.042** 0.144 0.154
Literacy Score
Notes: OLS regressions. Lower bounds à la Lee obtained by trimming upper tail in treatment group (see text for details). Scores are normalized such
that the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group are zero and one, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the school level in
parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. There are only 139 schools/clusters because tests could not
be administered in one of the ETP schools. Region and date of test dummies were included in all regressions but are not shown. 
ETP school x SBM x assigned to ETP contract 
    teacher
Total score Math score
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total 
Score
Math 
Score
Literacy 
Score
(1) ETP school -0.015 -0.038 0.006 -0.032 -0.054 -0.009
(0.085) (0.080) (0.087) (0.084) (0.079) (0.086)
(2) ETP school x SBM 0.155 0.176 0.113 0.126 0.153 0.084
(0.104) (0.089)** (0.111) (0.099) (0.087)* (0.107)
(3) ETP school x assigned to ETP contract teacher 0.105 0.080 0.103 0.074 0.055 0.074
(0.058)* (0.055) (0.058)* (0.057) (0.054) (0.058)
(4) -0.116 -0.124 -0.089 -0.098 -0.107 -0.072
(0.074) (0.077) (0.073) (0.073) (0.077) (0.073)
(5) School size (/100) 0.063 -0.082 0.160 0.073 -0.074 0.171
(0.094) (0.073) (0.105) (0.092) (0.071) (0.103)
(6) Share female among TSC teachers 0.419 0.253 0.473 0.399 0.236 0.454
(0.100)*** (0.086)*** (0.106)*** (0.098)*** (0.085)*** (0.104)***
(7) Average years of experience (/10) among TSC teac -0.013 -0.023 -0.003 -0.013 -0.024 -0.003
(0.061) (0.049) (0.068) (0.058) (0.048) (0.065)
(8) Girl 0.111 0.037 0.147 0.102 0.032 0.137
(0.025)*** (0.024) (0.027)*** (0.024)*** (0.023) (0.026)***
(9) Age -0.064 -0.033 -0.077 -0.068 -0.037 -0.080
(0.012)*** (0.011)*** (0.012)*** (0.011)*** (0.010)*** (0.011)***
(10) Baseline score 0.462 0.454 0.389 0.460 0.454 0.386
(0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)***
(11) Teacher has <1 year of experience -0.029 -0.009 -0.038 -0.027 -0.003 -0.039
(0.096) (0.091) (0.107) (0.090) (0.090) (0.101)
(12) Observations 6171 6171 6175 6094 6094 6098
(13) R-squared 0.210 0.190 0.170 0.210 0.190 0.170
(14) Total effect: ETP school+SBM 0.140 0.138 0.119 0.094 0.099 0.075
p-val (ETP School + SBM = 0 ) 0.154 0.082* 0.262 0.328 0.206 0.473
(15) Total effect: ETP school+contract teacher 0.090 0.042 0.109 0.042 0.001 0.065
p-val (ETP school +contact teacher = 0 ) 0.310 0.564 0.253 0.616 0.996 0.481
(16) Total effect: ETP school+SBM+contract teacher 0.129 0.094 0.133 0.070 0.047 0.077
p-val (ETP school +SBM +contract teacher = 0 ) 0.173 0.248 0.183 0.4370 0.556 0.430
Table A3. Regressions Results: Test Scores at Long-run Follow-up (1 year after program ended)
OLS Regressions
Notes: OLS regressions. Scores are normalized such that the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group are zero and
one, respectively. Standard errors clusters at school level. Region and date of test dummies were included in all regressions but are
not shown. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% , and 10% levels respectively.
Lee Lower Bounds
Total 
Score
Math 
Score
Literacy 
Score
ETP school x SBM x assigned to ETP contract 
    teacher
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(1) (2)
Class Size
Prob. Teacher 
Teachinga
(a) Extra-teacher program (ETP) school -39.43 -0.13
(3.93)*** (0.04)***
(b) ETP school x School based management (SBM) 2.60 0.09
(4.11) (0.04)**
(c) ETP school x  Contract teacher 2.40 0.22
(0.77)*** (0.04)***
(d) -3.67 -0.06
(1.46)** (0.060)
Observations 6531 6531
R-squared 0.44 0.12
Mean in Comparison Schools 83.40 0.558
p-value (a + b = 0) 0.000 0.226
F-Stat 33.5 10.4
ETP school x SBM x Contract Teacher
aProb. Teacher Teaching = Average across 5 unannounced spot checks by research team. Robust standard
errors clustered at the school level in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels.
Appendix Table A4. First-stage for IV estimates: Predicting Teacher Effort and Class Size with 
Experimental Variation
46
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Class Size (/100) -0.82 -0.77 -0.84 -0.80 -0.35 -0.42 -0.43 -0.66
(0.56) (0.40)* (0.58) (0.82) (0.22) (0.20)** (0.19)** (0.48)
Prob. teacher teachinga 0.55 0.40 -0.49 -0.57 0.91 0.95 0.99 2.09
(0.90) (1.08) (1.29) (1.52) (0.29)*** (0.41)** (0.38)*** (1.90)
Extra-teacher program teacher 0.04 -0.32
(0.39) (0.52)
Average experience of teachers -0.07 -0.25 -0.24 -0.03 -0.03 -0.08
(0.13) (0.17) (0.23) (0.05) (0.05) (0.12)
Share of female teachers 0.64 0.55 0.55 0.24 0.23 0.16
(0.16)*** (0.17)*** (0.17)*** (0.10)** (0.09)** (0.15)
Girl 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03)*** (0.03)***
Age -0.08 -0.08 -0.03 -0.03
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)** (0.02)*
Baseline score 0.62 0.62 0.47 0.46
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)***
Observations 1288 1288 1288 1288 5243 5217 5217 5217
Hansen overid p-value 0.91 0.32 0.97 0.51 0.64 0.62
Students in Schools with Initial Class Size 
<=Median
Table A5. IV Estimates of Effect of Class Size and Teacher's Effort on Test Scores, by Initial Class Size Category
Students in Schools with Initial Class Size > 
Median
Total Score
Notes: 2SLS estimation where Class size and Probability that Teacher Teaches are endogeneous regressors. The median class size at
baseline was 76 students per class (grade 1). Robust standard errors clustered at the school level are presented in parentheses. ***, **, *
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Class Size (/100) -0.33 -0.46 -0.49 -0.58
(0.20) (0.21)** (0.21)** (0.32)*
Prob. teacher teachinga 1.19 1.64 1.67 1.16
(0.32)*** (0.60)*** (0.61)*** (1.14)
ETP teacher 0.08
(0.25)
Average age of teachers 0.02 0.01 0.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Share of female teachers 0.19 0.21 0.24
(0.08)** (0.08)*** (0.08)***
Girl 0.06 0.07
(0.02)*** (0.02)***
Age -0.05 -0.05
(0.01)*** (0.01)***
Baseline score 0.50 0.51
(0.02)*** (0.02)***
Observations 9279 9254 9254 9254
Hansen overid p-value 0.55 0.33 0.39
Notes: 2SLS estimation where Class size and Probability that Teacher Teaches are endogeneous regressors. Robust standard errors clustered
at the school level are presented in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All regressions
include controls for Tracking status, startin in the Bottom Half of the test score distribution as baseline, as well as the following interactions:
Tracking * ETP teacher, Tracking * Bottom Half, Tracking * ETP Teacher * Bottom Half.
Table A6. IV Estimates of Effect of Class Size and Teacher's Effort on Test Scores, including Tracking Schools
Total Score
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